

文藝春秋

一九四〇年一月號よりの抜萃

9

獨逸外交の理念

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獨逸の外交は云々迄もさくヒトラー總統の外交である。ヒトラーは外交の三原則として名譽Reich、平等Gleichheit、自由Freiheitを上げて居る。即ち獨逸の名譽を自ら、平等を妨げ、自由を奪ふが如き、事に對しては、歎然といひ改義に努力せんとするものである。例へばウエルサイユ條約は此の三原則に反するものである。故に此の体制から脱せんとするべく、再軍備の宣言、ロカルハル條約の破棄、ラインランドの占領、その他獨逸が今日世界外交界と後に瞠若たるゝ所である諸々の果敢なる行動は、一と二の三綱領より出でやるはない。獨逸の名譽の為に、獨逸の平等の為に更に獨逸の自由の為に、その障害をちつてゐるものは一日も早く除去せねばならぬのである。

勿論實際問題といへば必ずしも原則通りには行かぬ。何れ國に於ても外交の原則は互派なものが擧げられる。弱國は力及ばずしてその理想を実行に移せず、強國は力に頼つて原則の盾の陰に隠れる。ただ獨逸は着々とその理想、指導する原理を実現しつゝある國の一つと云へよう。傍観者からは或ひは國家理想遂行に急いで、多大の無理はきいやうの懸念を與へようが、さくもヒトラー自身は機を見て堅実に

外交政策を爲してゐるに云ふ自信を持つてゐる。斯る考へ方は種々の外交政策に現はれてゐる、一例を擇ぐれば、最近の波蘭紛擾に於て世に喧傳されし「白書」に現れたる英國政府とトロイアの外交文書によると明かである。即ち英國は獨軍が波蘭に侵入する時獨軍の撤退を希望し、改めて白紙状態に於て獨波兩國政府間の商議開催を從ふ通し、然る時英政府も亦此商議に参加すべき事を申述べたのである。然るにヒトラーは断乎の要請を拒絶した。獨逸軍は進軍初期の目的を達せた後、即ち軍勝を確保せらる後ならば、英佛の斯る提案に耳を傾ける事も出来やうが、未だ正當な理由による出兵の目的を達成せらる中、外交交渉の便宜の爲として撤兵するには獨逸の「名譽」の爲に不可能である（論へて居るが如きである。以て如何に名譽を重んずるかを知る。

然らず無論今日の紛糾せる國際關係にあつては、往々口舌のみを以てしては、國家を宣教なしめる事は出来ぬ。その背後に立つて、大軍を短時日に整備し、斯る実力の支援のもとに、三原則の獨自の外交を爲せんとした事は窺知し得るゝである。目的貫徹の爲には最悪の場合は戦争の窮屈に至るを覺悟し、事に考へて、屡々無血の勝利を收める事が出来たりである。爲政者たる事の成行を見る明敏と、機に臨んでの決断と、強力なる軍隊、全國民を引きつけて行く一絲乱れざる統制と信賴があつたこそ、今日の獨逸再建の難業が果されつある? ある? しかし複雑なる歐洲情勢

○中は於てとく今日を致して云はざるを得ぬ。

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然しオーストリアを併合し前後二回に亘りチエコを處理した無血外交カランチ問題を契機として、ボーランドを殲滅し遂に東洋を敵とする第二次世界大戦の端緒をなした本は、その外交の大敗を見做し得ようか。蓋し外交は相手國あつての外交である。その時に臨んで如何様にも変化しうる性質のものであつて、今次戦争に到れるを獨外交の失敗乃至誤算と考へる本は必ずしも至らぬ言ではない。獨遂は從來とても常に戦争の準備をし、その基礎に立つて凡ゆる政策を爲し來つた。即ち自主積極の政策を行つた時、相手國の出様では何時にも干戈に訴へる決心があつた。斯くて無血外交の勝利を云はれたりであつて、今回も歎牛たる決意は決して変化しないはない。外交、軍事。斯る密接なる連繋こそ現在最も必要なものである。

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獨ソ不可侵條約締結の如きは、如何にも兩國共に惡く云へば狡猾の感を與へる。これにも憤慨した國民も少くない事と思ふ。然してトゞ一國の生死の瀬戸際になつて、正面作戦をうちが一正面で済むが或ひは此にうち戦ひを避けうを得るが浮沈の分かれ目に立たされた獨遂の最後にいたる策とて、我々は此を正面から反対するよりは少からうと思ふ。たゞ現在のソ聯が一方バルカン諸海に進出し一方極東に於ては日本との接近を欲しきる所では少からうが、勿論外交の本は臆測を許

シナがソ聯をもとへる際、支那がナチスにかかる事が可能では
ないかと思ふのである。

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獨逸外交はヒトラー總統自ら行ふ。リッペントロップはそのふた輔佐役である。ヒトラー自身は歐州大戰の一等兵出身である。何等外交の経験はない。彼獨自の性格から世界一流の人物となり、外交家ともなつたりである。彼は國務の繁忙の間常に歴史、哲学の書籍に親しみ多く考へ、一切の方策を彼の頭に結晶した原理より割り出しているのである。リッペントロップは全くヒトラーと同体であり、ヒトラーの外交上にいはば心もよく理解し、獨逸外交は、一人の手にまつて成ると言つても過言ではない。されば、その世界を驚嘆せしめる敏速果敢な外交を実行し得たのである。リッペントロップは非常に明敏な頭腦の持主であり、獨逸人に珍りよく勘のいい人である。しかも非常に強固な意志を持ち、一度決意すれば必ずやり通す型の人物である。蓋し現在のナチス・イデオロギーからする凜烈外交には他に適任者を見だる程のうまいつけの外交輔佐役である。

リッペントロップの特長は更に云へば、勢力といはぬ堅である。或る政策の実行に当つては必ず多少の障礙難關に遭遇するが、皆である。かかる際、彼はローマへもロンドンへも直に飛んで行き、敏速に處理する、誠に近代的國際政治家である。かかる活動型の人であるから、小節に拘泥する事なく、細かい交渉、論争は何れでも、大綱をしつかり個まととする。その意味で私は幾度か具体的接衝に際して、彼の勘のよさを認めてゐるを得なかつたのである。

彼は朝は外国人の手でさへ早くかけいが夜は衆に歸りまた仕事をくり抜張る。所謂の倫敦政治家全然型を異にする政治家である。

私は駐在武官としてケーリング以下を僕一人の交渉より大使とは云ふからはリバートロワ。必ず外交官政治家と號つて其等を羨んで感じた者は、ナイス植道子爵爵位何れも財が据つて居り年齢尚若かと有りである。

一九二三年十一月のニンペーに於ける暴動以來現任のナイス堂員は共産主義、社會民主主義の壓迫を受て、幾度か生死の間をくぐり朝夕危險に身を置しつゝ敗殘の體を今日ありしめる爲東奔西走したのである。それが彼等の人格に影響し、彼等を政治に貢献に國家の前途を憂ふ國難に處する爲政者たうじたと思ふ。

獨逸人は一般にケーリングがヒトラー統領は日本に対する言稱尊敬の念強く政治上の利害關係勿論あつた事であるが日本國体日本人の性格を非常に信頼してゐる。

ヒトラーはゲルマンの歷史立國の基礎傳統に遺産を拂ひ學校教育をその點に力を注いでゐた。蓋しキリストの歴史人を尊敬する國民はさへて其の國家の員として著せた果し得る事を彼は知つたからであつた。彼が我が二千六百年の歴史に尊敬の念を持つたのも當然の事である。

彼は又當中に勇氣を取て敵へかかる。九月一日國會にての演説にも、彼が前線にて死後はケーリングに相棒を委ね、ケーリング

敵れは人その性とす、人敵れは當員中最も勇敢なる者を選定せよ、と云つて直ちに戰場へ去、第一線に赴いたりである。日本人も亦非常に勇敢であり、死を恐れがる國民である。レトヲ
一はかく眞信に忠実にて勇敢果敢なるを愛した。

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さて歐洲戰爭はどうがるか、と云ふ豫想は、當事者に於く断案は下せないが當然である。近代戰は長期に及ぶ國家總力戰となり是が為に行はれるのである。今日の獨逸はかり此を熟知する。しかも戰爭を始めたるは長期戰に備へる準備あると共に短期りに勝利を齎し得る作戰上の自信があるのではないかも思はれる。然て勝利は云々かく水もアリ、何れが勝つと云へぬ。

過去の戰争の尺度を以て今次の戰争を計る者は危險である。當時の正面作戰は今は正面作戰となり、各國共に戰争を局地化せんとしてゐる。我々は世界の動向に絶えず眼を注ぎ、戰争をよく研究し、その結果に当つて静に考へねばならぬ。交戰國と非參加國とに拘らず強國は皆、の戰争に影響をうけるものである。政府はこの際國策を確立し、勇往直進せねばならぬ。

今日本對米政策も對ソ政策も、これを大きく我が世界政策の環として把握せねばならぬ。將來、日本のために大計を立て、國民をも納得せしめる事が必要である。

歐洲戰争は二十五年目に來つた。これを機に、我が日本が益々世界に進歩したるや、何人も努力すべしである。

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The Idea of German Diplomacy

(SHIMA Hiroshi

German diplomacy is, as a matter of fact, Fuehrer Hitler's diplomacy. Hitler mentions honour (Ehre), equality, (Gleichheit) and freedom (Freiheit) as the three principles of diplomacy. In other words, he means to bravely endeavour to improve such things as impair the honour of Germany, hinder her equality and take her freedom away.

For instance, the Versailles Treaty is against these three principles. Therefore Germany tried to break herself off from this regime, and the declaration of re-armaments, the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty, the occupation of Rhineland and other daring acts with which Germany is now throwing the world into utter amazement--they have all come from these three principles. Any obstacle to the honour of Germany, to the equality of Germany, and to the freedom of Germany must be swept as soon as possible.

Practical affairs of course do not always conform with principles. Each country has her own fine diplomatic principles. Weak countries are too powerless to carry out their ideals, while strong ones, depending upon their power, entrench themselves behind the shield of their principles. Germany, however, may be said to be one of those countries which are steadily carrying out their ideals and leading principles. Lookers-on may think that their state ideals are carried out too hastily and somewhat overbearingly, but at least Hitler himself is convinced that he is carrying out sound diplomatic policies at opportune moments.

This way of thinking is revealed in various diplomatic policies. To cite an example, it is clearly shown in Hitler's diplomatic document exchanged with the British Government in the well-known "blank document" in the recent Polish trouble. That is to say, Great Britain desired the withdrawal of the German

forces when they advanced into Poland, suggested that Germany and Poland should negotiate afresh on a blank slate and proposed that the British Government should also join in these negotiations at such time. Hitler, however, flatly refused this request.

As answered the German forces might give ear to such requests of Great Britain and France when they had accomplished the aim of their advances, namely after they had secured victory, but while the objective of advances with good reasons is not achieved, for the sake of German "honor", it is impossible to withdraw her troops, even for the convenience of diplomatic negotiations. This shows us how important they think of honour.

In the complicated international relations of today, however, mere speech cannot secure the safety of a country. It can be understood that she /Germany/ has endeavoured to maintain a strong army in a short time as a support to back her and to carry out her own diplomacy of the three principles under the support of this real power. She has often achieved bloodless victory because to accomplish her purposes, she attended to affairs being prepared for war in the worst case. The difficult work of the present reconstruction of Germany has been accomplished entirely because of the sagacity of the statesmen to perceive the development of things, decision at the right moment, a powerful army, perfect command with the whole nation under it and /the nation's/ trust /in the command/. It deserves our admiration that Germany has made herself what she is under the complicated situation of Europe.

Can it be considered that the bloodless diplomacy, however, which annexed Austria, and dealt with Csecho /-Slovakia/ twice, failed in its diplomacy by giving rise to the second Great World War by finally making a foe of England and France by annihilating Poland on the pretext of the Danzig problem?

Now, diplomacy presupposes the other party. It is by nature adaptable to any changes to suit the occasion, and it is not necessarily right to think that German diplomacy made a failure or a miscalculation in coming to the present War. Germany was always prepared for war and carried out all policies on that basis. That is to say, she was determined to resort to arms at any moment according to the other party's attitude towards her when she carried out her own positive policies.

In this way the victory of bloodless diplomacy came to be talked about, and her firm resolution was the same this time as before.

There is nothing more necessary at present than such close connection of diplomacy and military force.

The conclusion of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union gives us an impression that both countries were, evilly-speaking, too crafty. I think this infuriated not a few of the people. I think we cannot, however, rightly oppose /denounce/ this as the last measure Germany resorted to in her critical situation when by this means she would either be forced to make operations on two fronts or by only one front, or be able to avoid war. Is not the Soviet Union at present desiring merely to advance to the Baltic Sea on one hand and to reach a rapprochement with Japan in the Far East on the other? Diplomacy of course admits of no conjecture, but I think it may be possible at this juncture to make the Soviet Union wash her hands of China.

Fuehrer Hitler carries on German diplomacy himself. Ribbentrop is a good assistant to him. Hitler himself was a superior private in the World War /I/ and has no experience whatsoever as a diplomat. He has become from his particular character a first-class personage and diplomat in the world.

He takes to histories and philosophical works while busy in state affairs; meditates hard and is devising all policies from the principles which have crystallized in his head. Ribbentrop is quite one with Hitler and has a good understanding of Hitler's diplomatic belief, and it is not too much to say that German diplomacy lies in the hands of these two. Such being the case, quick daring diplomacy could be carried out which astonished the world. Ribbentrop has an acute intellect and a quick perception--a thing which Germans seldom have. He also has a very strong will and is a type of man who never fails to go through what he has determined to do. He is exactly the right diplomatic assistant who has no match in the positive diplomacy that is the upshot of the present "Nazis' ideology". Ribbentrop's trait is, to be more exact, to spare no pains. Usually no policies are carried out without some obstacles or other. He is truly a modern

international statesman who is ready, in such cases, to fly to Rome or London and handles the matter quickly. Being such a type of active man, he does not stick to trifles or care about minor details in negotiation or dispute, but tries to grasp main points. In this sense, I could not but recognize his quick perception in my various actual negotiations.

He is not a very early riser, as foreigners go, but tenaciously sits at work very late at night. He is quite a different type of statesman from the so-called petty officials.

I had much intercourse with Goering and other military men while I was a resident officer, and I have been acquainted with Ribbentrop and other diplomats and statesmen since I was an ambassador. These men gave me an impression that the Nazi leaders were all settled in resolution and that they were young.

Since the München disturbance in November, 1923, the present Nazis have been under the oppression of communism and social democracy, have often lingered on the verge of death, have exposed themselves to danger from morning till night--they have busied themselves so much to make the defeated Germany what she is today--a fact which I think has had an effect upon their character, has trained them and has made of them statesmen who are sincerely anxious about the future of their country and grapple with their national crisis.

As Germans usually do, Führer Hitler strongly trusts and respects Japan. It is true that he had political interest, but he depends much upon the Japanese nationality and the character of the Japanese.

Hitler paid attention to German history and the traditions of the foundation of their country, upon which school education also laid stress. This is perhaps because he knew that a man could not perform his duty as a citizen of his country unless he respected the history of his country. It was quite natural that he respected our history of 2600 years.

He also teaches, "Be always brave". In his speech in the Reichstag of Sep. 1, he said, "Let Goering be commander when I am killed at the front; let Hess succeed Goering when he dies; and choose the bravest Nazi when Hess dies," and went immediately to the front and to

the first line. The Japanese are likewise very brave, a people who do not fear death. Hitler was thus faithful to his belief and loved to be bold and daring.

It is quite natural that even the parties concerned should be unable to foretell the saying, "what will become of the European War". The view is prevalent that a modern war is a protracted national total war. Germany is now of course well aware of this. And yet she has entered into war, so we might think that she is prepared for a protracted war and at the same time has confidence in her operations to win the war in a short time.

Victory is, however, as is called, an uncertain affair. Nobody can tell which side will win.

It is dangerous to judge the present war by the standards of past wars. What were operations on two fronts before are now operations on one front, and each country is trying to localise the war. We have to constantly watch how the world is moving, to make a good study of war and to ponder quietly upon its results. Whether they are participants or not, all Powers are affected by the war in question. Our Government, at this juncture, must establish national policies and to exert itself to carry them out.

Our policies towards the United States and towards the Soviet Union must be grasped in a wide sense as links of our world policy. A far-sighted policy has to be formulated for future Japan so as to win the consent of the people.

The European War occurred after a lapse of 25 years. Everybody must take this opportunity to lead Japan to greater prosperity in the world.